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In a recent article on the mapping of DNA1, we are told the following: 
 
Had one of his parents been slightly less fortunate in their choice of a 
mate, James Watson might not have helped discover the structure of 
DNA in 1953. Instead, he would have been born deaf, and then lost his 
sight as he became a teenager. Equally, as he is, had he been less 
fortunate in the genetic lottery when he chose his wife, either of their 
sons might have had the same fate. 
This is because Watson's complete DNA - his genome - contains a single 
gene for Usher's syndrome, an inherited disorder which affects hearing 
and sight. Watson's must have come from one of his parents. Usher's is 
a "recessive" disease - you need two copies of the gene to be affected. 
About five people per 100,000 carry the gene, so Watson's chances of 
being disabled weren't large. But they were real.  
 
Using the figures given and elementary risk math, the chances of James 
Watson being disabled in this way were: 
 
        5     0 x         5     0=     25    = one in 400 million 
100,000        100,000         10bn 
 
(In fact, less than this because, as the article later states, if both parents have 
the gene there is only a 1 in 4 chance of a child being disabled as a result.) 
 
The figures in the article are no doubt either wrong or a gross simplification, as 
a simple google search will show2, but what is more interesting is the standard 
                                             
1 Mapping the Individual – cheaply Charles Arthur.  Guardian Technology 24 April 2008.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/apr/24/research.politics  
2 since the Guardian is arguably the most editorially careful of the UK newspapers, the 
implications of this in relation to the general standard of journalism are serious, but are not part 
of the remit of this brief paper  
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of “reality” which the journalist somnambulantly (one can only assume he was 
dreaming in some way) applies.  A risk of 1:400m is deemed to be “real”.  This 
raises a question about popularist ontology: by what standard do we commonly 
measure “reality”?  What is given the status of the “real” for us and in relation 
to legitimate debate in our culture? 
 
Second example:  I act as assessor for a not-for-profit organisation in the UK 
which gauges the competence of design firms in the construction industry 
(architects, engineers, etc) in respect of their health and safety skills.  If, as a 
construction-industry designer, you wish to be placed on public-sector tender 
lists for work, you would often need to be assessed by this scheme3.  Amongst 
others, the global engineering firm ARUP4 is currently applying to the scheme.  
One of my recent tasks was to assess a firm of landscape architects whose 
offices happen to lie close to mine.  On the day their application was being 
finalised, I noticed that they were arranging the installation of large plants on 
their roof terrace.  Due to their apparent lack of competence in commissioning 
this work, it was being done in a risky manner: one of the operatives was 
standing unprotected on a parapet with a drop of 7m (25’) to one side.  Not 
only that; the terrace itself was an inherently risky place to do work, because 
the parapet was less than 900mm (3’) high.  Both the situation and the work 
being done were per se illegal in the UK.  Yet these landscape architects will be 
assessed as “competent” in health and safety terms by means of a paper-based 
routine.  In other words, the “reality” of their position vis-à-vis health and safety 
in society is established without reference to the “reality” (perhaps this word 
should not be in scare quotes) of the construction work they themselves 
commission, or indeed to any other real-world situation.  We might speak of this 
situation metaphorically as a necessary ritual (the paper-based application to the 
                                             
3 see www.chas.gov.uk  
4 www.arup.com  
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scheme); administered by a more or less sceptical priest (myself); for an 
agnostic congregation (the applicants); in order to confer a type of social 
cleanliness (the right to bid for public sector work, given an adequate standard 
of respect for health and safety issues). 
 
Third example:  as readers may be aware, there has been some debate recently 
about the risks of catastrophe as a result of large-scale scientific experiments, 
specifically Large Hadron Colliders in Europe.  These risks have been analysed in 
reasonably coherent and understandable fashion by Adrian Kent5. In an earlier 
article by Dar et al 6, physicists had come to the conclusion that the bounds of 
the chance of a catastrophic event (ie something like the destruction of the 
earth as we know it, together with all civilization and humanity) could be 
expressed thus:  P(catastrophe)<2x10-8 over the ten-year period during which the 
collider in Europe is going to operate.  This hazard, as Kent notes, “has been 
widely referred to [in other papers and reports] in terms which suggest that it 
alone would be sufficiently reassuring to require no further analysis or risk 
optimisation”7.   Expressed in layperson’s terms, it implies a chance of less than 
one in 50 million, or about “the risk of a typical US citizen dying in a shark 
attack in any given year”8.  However, as Kent notes, the Dar et al paper does 
not relate that chance to the potential seriousness of the result. 
 
This is in contrast to the requirements on employers in the European Union.   
The analysis carried out for the Large Hadron Collider experiment was not 
carried as far as a basic risk assessment of the type that any employer in the 
                                             
5 Kent, Adrian, A critical look at risk assessments for global catastrophes 
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/hep-ph/pdf/0009/0009204v6.pdf 
6 A. Dar et al., Will relativistic heavy ion colliders destroy our planet?, Phys. Lett. B, 470 142-
148 (1999); archived at hep-ph/9910471 
7 A critical look at risk assessments for global catastrophes p5 
8 p7 
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EU must now carry out as a matter of course9.  In this type of risk assessment, 
employers must multiply the seriousness of the outcome with the possibility of 
its occurring in order to complete a risk assessment, using a notional numerical 
figure for “seriousness”; so, for instance, in the situation described above 
where an operative is faced with the hazard of a fall from height (the means by 
which most fatalities and casualties occur in the construction industry), the 
chance of a fall (in this instance perhaps medium to slight) would be multiplied 
by the seriousness of the effect  (almost certain death on the part of the 
operative) to give an outcome (the risk expressed in numerical terms) which 
would show that the risk was unacceptable.  It was precisely this multiplication 
of effect with the chance of its outcome which was missing in the earlier paper 
on Large Hadron Colliders. 
 
Kent’s article calls what an employer in the UK would term a “risk assessment” 
the “expectation”.  He multiplies the chance of 2x10-8 (ie one in fifty million) by 
the population of the earth (6x109 – six billion) to give an “expectation” of 120 
deaths over the ten year period.  In other words, the risks associated with the 
Large Hadron Collider are the statistical equivalent of the risk associated with an 
activity which will kill 120 people over ten years.  As Kent says, “put this way, 
the bound seems far from adequately reassuring”10.  What is perhaps most 
remarkable in this whole scene is that the leader of European collider project, 
Alvaro de Rujula, was quoted as saying that it would be “absurd”11 to multiply 
the chance of the event by the global population.  It is calculations of precisely 
this type which EU employers are required by law to implement in relation to, 
say, the hazard of slipping on a wet floor. 
 
                                             
9 implemented in the UK by means of the Management Of Health And Safety At Work 
Regulations 1999 SI 1999 No 3242 available at www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1999/19993242.htm  
10 A critical look at risk assessments for global catastrophes p7 
11 Gambling with the Earth, New Scientist 7.10.00, p. 4. 
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Reading these examples through the lens of Mary Douglas’s work, in particular 
the essay Risk and Blame and its reference back to her earlier Purity and Taboo, 
we may well ask if there is essentially any difference between what she calls 
“the rational behaviour of primitives”12 in their use of taboo to protect society, 
and our use of other so-called rational means to apportion risk and blame.  If 
“communities tend to be organised on one or another dominant form of 
explanation”13, then an analysis of the use of risk and its associated ontological 
presuppositions leads one to agree with Douglas that risk is almost purpose-
made for modern industrial society where we attempt to do exactly what the 
“primitives” (Douglas’ word) taboo achieves, namely “to treat every death as 
chargeable to someone’s account, every accident as caused by someone’s 
criminal negligence”14.  This insight provides a link between Douglas and Beck:  
industrial society becomes risk society, in Beck’s terms, as the latent hazard-
effects of industrialisation act reflexively (not reflectively – it is not a question 
of thought, as Beck clarifies later15) on society, both reconfiguring the means by 
which blame is apportioned and giving the means by which this reconfiguration 
can occur. 
 
We may ask why it is that “the idea of risk could have been custom-made” to 
fill our needs in post-industrial society for “justice and welfare”16?  The reason, I 
believe, is the co-incidence and interplay between the reconfiguration of the 
means of apportioning blame, and the (possible, becoming actual) method for 
doing this.  It is a common strategy in rational analysis to separate off meta-
questions about method from the “concrete” problems which are being 
analysed.  This enables the question of method to be de-politicised, made 
neutral and thus natural, to a large extent thus unquestionable.  On this basis, 
                                             
12 Risk and Blame p4 
13 Risk and Blame p5 
14 Risk and Blame p15 
15 in Reflexive Modernization Beck, Giddens, Lash p6 
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the question of blame can be raised and then answered by means of a method 
of risk assessment and blame, with its attendant ontological presuppositions, 
without any recognition of the possibility that the convenience of those 
presuppositions may be feeding back into the process and encouraging it. 
 
The specific “ontological presupposition” I am referring to here is that of cause 
and effect, which is the “dominant form of explanation” for our culture, and the 
underlying presupposition of the analysis of risk.  The interesting thing about 
these categories are that in their linear, simple and temporal scope they prevent, 
per se, the raising of the question of such complex interplays of method and our 
notions of “reality”.  The linearity of the categories of cause and effect disallow 
the consideration of a feedback mechanism from the phenomena of the 
convenience and simplicity of the category to its (resultant) hegemonic status.  
In short, the answer to Douglas’s ironic observation that the concept of “risk 
could have been custom-made” for post-industrial society is that it is as much 
that post-industrial society was made for it.  The cause and effect goes both 
ways in a reciprocal motion. 
 
This means that the category of cause and effect is not adequate to the 
analysis, since reciprocity of this type is not consistent with the rigorous 
definition of cause and effect.  This is clearly shown in Kant’s first critique, 
where his table of categories, in the third part “Of Relation”, makes a distinction 
between relations “Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)” and those 
“Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient) [der Gemeinschaft – 
Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Handelnden und Leidenden]”17.  In Kant’s 
transcendental method, each category is related back to a means of judgement, 
in this case a “disjunctive” logic, as opposed to the “hypothetical” logic of 
                                                                                                                                         
16 Risk and Blame p15 
17 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (trans NK Smith) p 113 
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cause and effect.  The link between the category of community and disjunctive 
judgement is complex, Kant says, and he goes on to give a succinct and useful 
analysis of them: 
 
 Now in a whole which is made up of things…. one thing is not 
subordinated, as effect, to another, as cause if its existence, but, 
simultaneously and reciprocally, is co-ordinated with it, as cause of the 
determination of the other…. This is quite a different kind of connection 
from that which is found in the mere relation [blossen Verhaeltnis ] of 
cause and effect… for in the latter relation the consequence does not in 
its turn reciprocally determine the ground18 
 
In brief therefore, my argument for discussion is the following: 
• examples of the use of risk analysis at various scales (DNA, the 
construction industry, multi-billion dollar scientific experiments) tend to 
show a lack of rational coherence, despite the judgement of “reality” 
which is associated with these analyses and the legal/social weight put 
upon them 
• in Douglas’s terms, the supposed rationality of risk in our society and 
culture can be given the same status of that of taboo in “primitive” 
societies.  That is, despite a patent lack of coherence and rigor about the 
use of the notion of “risk”, it maintains its strength as a means of 
judgement integral with our post-industrial society and its mores 
• in other words, just as the “primitive” has no choice but to grasp at an 
immediate means of assessing blame and in so doing allows for 
judgement and justice, so too we require similar means 
• but why these means?  Why is “risk” so consonant with our society?  
The argument would be not only that it results from an over-reliance on 
the category of cause and effect and its associated means of 
hypothetical judgement (to use Kant’s terminology); but that the 
advantage of the linear method of “cause and effect” rationality is to 
                                             
18 p117 
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simplify the analysis to such an extent that meta-questions of the 
feedback of the method on the thing being analysed can be ruled out 
 
In short, matters which should perhaps be issues of “community”, with 
communal, complex and interplaying relations, are often analysed by means 
of an inappropriate category and an inappropriately simple means of 
judgement. 
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